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RELIEF FOR PRISON
OVERCROWDING: EVALUATING
MICHIGAN'S ACCELERATED
PAROLE STATUTE

The unprecedented growth of state prison populations during
the past decade 1 has created a national prison overcrowding crisis. 2 State failure to respond to the emerging crisis has left corrections officials with substandard facilities. 3 These inadequate
1. See 2 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 1-42 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 2 AMERICAN PRISONS]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SouRCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JusTICE STATISTICS - 1980 491-93 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SouRCEBOOK];
Krajick, The Boom Resumes, CORRECTIONS MAG., Apr. 1981, at 16, 16 (noting that prison
population grew by 42% between 1975 and 1980).
Current figures show that the combined federal and state prison population increased
more in the first six months of 1981 than in all of 1980. If this trend continues, the
United States will have produced its highest prison growth rate in 56 years. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1981, at 9, col. 1 (midw. ed.). Commentators have suggested a variety of reasons
for the increase. See Krajick, supra at 17 (focusing on four factors to explain the increase: growing population, increasing crime rates, stiffer sentencing provisions, and
more restrictive parole practices); 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
13-14 (1978) (also focusing on five factors to explain the increase: changing population
size and composition due to the post-World War II "baby boom," increased political
· emphasis on imprisonment, higher crime rate, longer sentences, and impact of unemployment and inflation); Lieber, The American Prison: A Tinderbox, N. Y. Times,
March 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (contending that the increase is due to a shift in
legislative sentencing policies); 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND
JAILS 23 (1980) (citing the "baby boom," economic dislocations of unemployment and
inflation, longer sentences, more serious crimes, and restrictive parole policies as the factors primarily responsible for the increase) [hereinafter cited as 1 AMERICAN PRISONS].
See generally 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra (documenting factors that have influenced the
rise in prison population).
2. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 12-19; cf. SoURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 490
(noting that state inmates in many states are being housed in local jails because of
overcrowding).
3. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 12-19; see also 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra
note 1, at 1; Hagstrom, Crowded Prisons Pose a Budget Problem for this Law-and-Order
Administration, 13 NAT'L J. 1821, 1822 (1981) (contending that liberals who opposed
prison construction in favor of non-traditional alternatives and conservatives who refused to "coddle" criminals by spending money on prisons are responsible for the lag in
prison construction); Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners Grievances, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 175, 191 (1970) (noting that legislatures have not traditionally provided
authority or funds for basic institutional changes); Cohn, The Failure of Correctional
Management Revisited, FED. PROBATION, March 1979, at 10, 10-11 (corrections officials
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prisons impose significant costs on both prisoners and the public; overcrowding physically endangers the incarcerated' and
heightens the potential for prison disturbances and destruction. 11
Moreover, where overcrowding requires judicial intervention, the
state's ability to design a cost-effective, long-term solution may
be impaired. 8
Many state correctional agencies have attempted to ease the
crisis by initiating prison construction. 7 The extent and potential impact of new construction, however, is confined by budgetneglected to determine and pursue organizational objectives); Fogel, The Politics of Corrections, FED. PROBATION, March 1977, at 27, 28 (politicians care little about prisons or
prisoners). See generally notes 17-18 and accompanying text infra.
4. Health problems are caused by the physical crowding of prisoners and by the inability of an overburdened staff to meet the basic needs of the expanded population. See,
e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1277, 1280-81 (S.D. Tex. 1980), stayed pending
appeal, 650 F. 2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112-18
(D. Del. 1977). Studies have linked overcrowded conditions or perceptions of crowding
with illness complaints, disciplinary infractions, deaths, suicides, self-mutilation, psychiatric commitments and violent confrontations between inmates and staff. See generally
G. McCAIN, V. Cox & P. PAULUS, THE EFFECT OF PRISON OVERCROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR (1980); McCain, Cox & Paulus, The Relationship between Illness Complaints
and Degree of Crowding in a Prison Environment, 8 ENV'T & BEHAV. 265 (1976);
Megargee, Population Density and Disruptive Behavior in a Prison Setting, in PRISON
VIOLENCE 135 (Cohen, Cole & Bailey ed. 1976); Nacci, Teitelbaum & Prather, Population
Density and Inmate Misconduct Rates in the Federal Prison System, FED. PROBATION,
June 1977, at 26; Walker & Gordon, Health and High Density Confinement in Jails and
Prisons, FED. PROBATION, March 1980, at 53. But cf. J. FREEDMAN, CROWDING AND BEHAVIOR (1975) (concludes high density does not have ill effects on those living in urban
areas).
5. See generally OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE FEBRUARY 2 AND 3 1980 RIOT AT THE PENITENTIARY OF
NEW MEXICO (1980) (concluding that overcrowding added to the high level of tension at
the penitentiary); OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF MICHIGAN, SPECIAL GOVERNOR'S
COMMITTEE REPORT ON PRISON DISTURBANCES (1981) (noting that overcrowding was a factor in the series of riots which occurred in May 1981 at the State Prison of Southern
Michigan (Jackson), the Michigan Reformatory at Ionia, and the Marquette Branch
Prison) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PRISON DISTURBANCES] (on file with the Journal
of Law Reform); REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PRISON DISTURBANCES (1981) (concluding that overcrowding contributed to the Michigan prison riots)
[hereinafter cited as INVESTIGATION OF PRISON DISTURBANCES] (on file with the Journal of
Law Reform). See also CORRECTIONS MAG., Dec. 1981, at 3 (overcrowding cited as factor
in hour-long riot at Indiana State Reformatory at Pendleton); N. Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1980, at 51, col. 1 (corrections officials nationwide fear prison disturbances will result
from overcrowding); N. Y. Times, May 19, 1981, § 2, at 9, col. 2 (suggesting that overcrowding of New Jersey state prisons was a factor in the strangulation death of a guard).
6. See Dole, Reversing Court Control of Corrections, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1982,
at 24, 24.
7. By July 1980, state correctional agencies across the nation had begun construction
of more than 60 prisons or prison additions at a projected cost of more than $700 million.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME 76
(1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON VIOLENT CRJME].
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ary restraints. 8 Other crisis management measures - double celling,9 temporary housing,1° and retention of state prisoners in
local jails 11 - also have been used to relieve prison overpopulation pressures. Prison populations, nevertheless, continue to exceed institutional capacity. u
Until recently, states that confronted prison overcrowding relied on one or more of three traditional remedies: 13 construction
of new prisons, enlargement of community corrections, and ad
hoc 14 regulation of prisoner intake and release. In 1981, Michigan enacted the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act 111
("the Act") - a novel statutory measure designed to reduce the
state's prison population by accelerating parole releases during
prison overcrowding emergencies. The Act has attracted the attention of correctional agencies and prison reform groups
throughout the nation. 18 Although the concept of reducing pris8. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 125.
9. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (double celling has been used in
the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility since 1975); Lareau v. Manson, 651 F. 2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1981) (double celling used in Hartford Community Correction Center); Smith v.
Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186 (C. D. Ill. 1981) (double celling used in the Pontiac Correctional Center).
10. In some New Jersey facilities, inmates sleep in storage rooms, lavatories, recreation rooms, hallways, classrooms, and trailers. N. Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1981, § 2, at 1, col.
1. In Alabama, 222 prisoners were ordered released by a federal district court because of
"grossly inadequate facilities." N. Y. Times, July 16, 1981, at 12, col. 1. In Texas, nearly
2,700 of the state's 32,000 prisoners are living in army tents to reduce double and triple
celling. N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1982, at 12, col. 4 (midw. ed.).
11. SoURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 490. Indeed, the prison overcrowding problem is
often shifted to county and city jails where state officials have housed thousands of prisoners awaiting transfer to state facilities. States have frequently reduced state prison
populations in this manner to meet court orders. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at
37-39.
12. See Krajick, supra note 1, at 16.
13. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 119-24.
14. The term "ad hoc," as employed in this Note, refers to measures that are informal, highly discretionary, and typically devised to meet an immediate emergency. These
measures should be distinguished from formal statutory measures which are the product
of traditional political processes.
15. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.71-79 (Supp. 1981).
16. The state legislature and Department of Corrections have received inquiries
about the. Act from correctional agencies and prison reform groups in over 25 states.
Interview with James Boyd, Aide to the House Corrections Committee and Member of
the Task Force on Prison Overcrowding, in Lansing (Oct. 8, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Boyd Interview I]; Interview with Gail Light, Public Information Director of the Department of Corrections, in Lansing (Nov. 17, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Light Interview].
Several state legislatures have adopted similar measures. See 1981 lowA ACTS 11, § 3(1);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 18-87c, 18-87d (1981); S.J. Res. 14, 38th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1981
Okla. Sess. Laws 1291.
In addition, the Michigan Act prompted the introduction of a recent Michigan House
Bill authorizing county sheriffs to take emergency release measures after declaring a
county jail overcrowding state of emergency. See H.B. 5328, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981).
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oner sentences to relieve prison overcrowding is not new, Michigan is the first state to develop a statutory method of accelerating parole releases. The Act is responsive to the needs of prison
administrators and prisoners as well as to the general public.
This Note describes and analyzes Michigan's Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act. Part I reviews briefly current
efforts to relieve prison overcrowding and concludes that traditional remedies are largely inadequate. Part II examines the
early prisoner release statute and its implementation. Finally,
Part III evaluates the statute's success in relieving prison
overcrowding..
I.

CURRENT RESPONSES TO STATE PRISON OVERCROWDING

The American prison system is not the product of a grand correctional scheme, but the result of layers of shifting custom and
correctional policy. 17 The failure of state legislatures to design a
comprehensive correctional program and to confront inadequacies in the development of penal policies stems from the complexity of correctional reform and the political liability legislators associate with such reform. 18 While neglect of correctional
planning created a fertile environment for the current crisis,
overcrowding is the direct result of conflicting public demands;
increasing numbers of offenders are being imprisoned at the
same time that budget cuts limit prison construction or development of alternatives. 19 Nevertheless, state governments, spurred
by the threat of increasing federal court intervention in prisons
and prison systems, 20 have resorted consistently to a combina17. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 2
(1975); W. NAGEL, THE NEw RED BARN: A CRITICAL LooK AT THE MODERN AMERICAN
PRISON 154-55 (1973).
18. See Smith, Prison Reform through the Legislature, in E. WRIGHT, THE Potmcs
OP PUNISHMENT 262-63 (1973); Wright, Prison Reform and Radical Change, in E.
WRIGHT, THE POLITICS OP PUNISHMENT, supra, at 313, 321 (legislatures frequently fail to
appropriate adequate funds for prisons because prisoners lack political leverage); NAGEL,
supra note 17, at 154-55. See also Dole, supra note 6, at 24 (suggesting that if there are
no major prison disturbances, the public is unwilling to spend money on offenders in
prisons); Dionne, Courts and Prisons, N. Y. Times, Jan; 1, 1982, at 10, col. 1 (midw. ed.)
(contending that prison construction is low in the order of current political priorities); cf.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1981, at 14, col. 1 (midw. ed.) (emphasizing the complexity of c~iminal justice reforms and urging that politicians not rely on simple solutions).
19. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 1-2, 12-19, 125-26. In Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337 (1981), Justice Brennan noted that increasing federal court intervention has
resulted from inadequate funding of prisons in the face of steadily rising prison populations. Rhodes at 358-59 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Prisons or entire prison systems in 30 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
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tion of traditional strategies to relieve the overcrowding problem.
A.

Prison Construction

Constructing new prison facilities is regarded commonly as the
simplest means of alleviating prison overpopulation,21 and is frequently the keystone in state and federal plans. 22 Most states,
however, are either unable or unwilling 23 to meet the cost of
prison construction needed for expanding prison populations.
Federal proposals designed to subsidize state prison construction, 24 however, do not offer an adequate remedy. Despite the
fiscal relief these measures would afford states, plans to fund
prison construction without requiring responsible correctional
planning26 simply encourage the traditional "out of sight, out of
mind" approach to criminal justice. 26 This approach eliminates
accountability for sentencing decisions and undermines the deRico, and the Virgin Islands are under court order to remedy substandard conditions.
See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, STATUS REPORT - THE
CouRTS AND PRISONS (1982) [hereinafter cited as STATUS REPORT] (on file with the Jour·
nal of Law Reform).
21. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 119; Lieber, supra note 1, at 60.
22. See Hagstrom, supra note 3, at 1821.
23. More than 30 states have either proposed building or have under construction at
least one major correctional facility. Many of these states have found additional facilities
so costly that they cannot afford staffing and operation once the addition is completed.
Other states have had to abandon construction projects in progress due to cost overruns.
REPORT ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 7, at 76; Hagstrom, supra note 3, at 1821.
24. Two proposals are presently under consideration. The Senate has proposed that a
Criminal Justice Facilities Administration be created in the Justice Department to dispense federal subsidies of $6.5 billion to states over seven years for construction and
modernization projects. S. 186, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Attorney General's Task
Force on Violent Crime has proposed federal legislation providing $2 billion over four
years for state construction of correctional facilities. REPORT ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra
note 7, at 75. The current economic climate and federal fiscal policies may hinder congressional efforts to fund either broad program of prison construction. See Gentry, The
Reagan Corrections Program: Less Money, More States' Rights, CORRECTIONS MAG.,
Dec. 1981, at 29, 31; Hagstrom, supra note 3, at 1821. See generally Dole, supra note 6
(discussing S. 186 and potential funding problems).
25. The Task Force concluded that establishing a review process or requiring states
to develop long-range, comprehensive plans was undesirable. REPORT ON VIOLENT CRIME,
supra note 7, at 77. Neither the Senate nor the Attorney General's proposed approach
requires evidence demonstrating that more efficient or effective alternatives have been
explored. See generally D. GORDON, DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CRIME PROBLEM: A RESPONSE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE 7-11 (1981). But sees. 186, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (requiring submission of a seven-year plan outlining a program for construction of facilities).
26. See NAGEL, supra note 17, at 148-49 (suggesting that prisons foster the illusion of
a forceful response to crime, when in reality the criminal and the problem are simply"
removed from sight).
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velopment of systemic reforms to resolve the overcrowding
problem. 27
Although some prison construction may be needed, 28 commitment to a broad program of state prison construction presents
several problems. First, the correctional benefits of conventional,
closed institutions are questionable. Community-based programs
appear to have had greater success in reintegrating offenders
into society. 29 Second, a broad program of prison construction
encourages imprisonment of offenders when state penal policies
should strive to keep more nonviolent offenders out of prison. 30
Third, the scarcity of state resources demands that every crime
control approach undergo cost-benefit analysis; massive prison
construction is not the most cost-effective means of solving the
overcrowding problem. 31
27. See generally id.
28. Hagstrom, supra note 3, at 1823 (noting that while there is general acceptance of
the need for prison construction, there is widespread -disagreement over how much and
what kind of prison construction is needed, as well as who should be in prison).
29. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS 222-23 (1973) (concluding that major adult institutions operated by the
states represent the least promising means of achieving rehabilitation and reintegration,
and therefore institutional construction should be postponed until prisoners have been
transferred - to the greatest extent possible - to community-based programs).
See also Martinson, What works? - Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22, 47 (1974) (concluding that community treatment inflicts less
suffering on the offender than prison without posing an increased danger to the public);
Wicker, The Last Resort, N. Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1980, at 27, col. 5 (illustrating the benefit of restitution as an alternative to incarceration).
30. Frank, The American Prison: The End of an Era, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1979, at
3, 7. See NAGEL, supra note 17, at 149; Wicker, The Wrong Answer, N. Y. Times, Nov. 3,
1981, at 23, col. 1 (midw. ed.).
Two competing ideologies shape current prison policy. The first is derived from the
liberal-utilitarian ideology of deterrence and correction. Proponents of this view argue
that prison reform should attempt to keep people out of prison. Institutional incarceration can only be justified to sequester violent and dangerous offenders. The second ideology is founded in retributive justice. Proponents of this view support imprisonment as a
form of retributive justice demanded by law and the victim. See generally, Frank, supra
(tracing the tension between these two views).
31. Prison construction will not alleviate overcrowding in the short run because five
years are likely to pass between the date of a decision to construct a prison and the date
the first inmate enters. 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 2. Also, demographic shifts
in population may naturally reduce prison populations through the next several decades.
Id. at 115-18. Moreover, costs of construction, custody, security, and administration of
new cells are substantial even if offset by federal subsidies. Gordon, supra note 25, at 10;
see REPORT ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 7, at 76 (noting that the cost of constructing a
maximum security facility is over $70,000 per bed in many jurisdictions, the cost in medium security institutions can reach $50,000 per bed, and expenditures for yearly operating costs generally range from $10,000 to $20,000 per cell). The decision to implement a
broad prison construction program may also limit the opportunity of future generations
to experiment with alternatives to incarceration. NAGEL, supra note 17, at 154-55.
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B. Enlargement of Community-Based Corrections
Enlarging community corrections facilities is another means of
reducing prison overpopulation. In general, community-based
corrections permit residents to live and work in the community. 32 Despite the rapid growth of community corrections programs since the late 1960's, community corrections facilities hold
only a small percentage of the nation's state prisoners. 33 An increase in direct assignment of offenders and pre-release transfer
of prisoners to community-based programs would reduce prison
populations. 34
There are, however, several obstacles to the expansion of community corrections. A recent survey suggests that the vast majority of community corrections facilities can not serve more
residents without violating corrections' housing standards. 311 Furthermore, local community opposition to the introduction of new
facilities, as well as shifting correctional practices, and insuffi32. Community sanctions include: pre-trial and pre-sentence diversion and treatment
programs; non-residential programs of post-conviction supervision (including traditional
forms of probation); residential restitution and community corrections centers; pre-release programs and facilities; parole supervision and related post-release services. See 1
AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 121.
Three justifications are frequently advanced for using community corrections: (1)
treatment of offenders in the community is more humane than placement in traditional
penal institutions - the offender can maintain ties with his family and friends, and
remain in the job market; (2) successful reintegration into society can be accomplished •
most effectively in a community setting; (3) community rehabilitation is less expensive
than incarceration. H. ALLEN, E. CARLSON, E. PARKS & R. SEITER, HALFW Av HousEs 1
(1978). See Blackmore, Community Corrections, CORRECTIONS MAG., Oct. 1980, at 4, 4;
Lieber, supra note 1, at 61.
33. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 69.
34. See 5 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 23 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 5 AMERICAN PRISONS]. But see note 37 and accompanying text infra.
35. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 71-72. See generally 5 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 34, at 23-43 (reviewing the physical capacity, density and crowding in
pre-release community centers). Current standards stipulate that community-based corrections facilities must provide each resident in a community residential unit with a minimum of 60 square feet of floor space. COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS,
MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL SERVICES 14 (1977). The National Institute of Justice Survey, however, concluded that nearly one-third of all community corrections residents were provided with less than 60 square feet. 5 AMERICAN
PRISONS, supra note 34, at 37. Similarly, current standards also suggest that a maximum
of three residents be placed in each sleeping room and that no facility house more than
20 residents. J. MCCARTT & T. MANGOGNA, GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR HALFWAY
HOUSES AND COMMUNITY TREATMENT CENTERS 81 (1973); COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION
FOR CORRECTIONS, supra at xxi. The survey found that nearly half of all residents were
assigned to units with three or more persons, and that only 47% of the surveyed facilities - housing a mere 23% of total community residents - limited the number of residents per facility to 20. 5 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 34, at 40.
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cient funds are likely to inhibit expansion. 38 Even if these
problems are surmounted, enlarging community corrections still
may not reduce prison populations; the total number of persons
under correctional control may multiply as the system's overall
capacity is expanded. 37 Corrections officials fail frequently to
distinguish this added capacity from replacement capacity when
calculating the benefits that an expansion of community corrections facilities will provide.

C.

Regulation of Prisoner Intake and Release

A recent congressionally-mandated survey of adult corrections
suggests that regulation of prisoner intake and release responds
more effectively to prison overcrowding than either prison construction or expansion of community corrections facilities. 38 Yet
prior to the enactment of Michigan's accelerated parole statute,
state efforts to relieve overcrowding by regulating prison intake
and release were informal and highly discretionary. 39 The ad hoc
application of these measures caused state officials to give scant
attention to regulation of intake and release as a tool to relieve
prison overcrowding. 40
1. Prisoner Release- Among states that presently employ ad
hoc measures to regulate prison populations, accelerated parole
is the most widely applied mechanism for controlling prisoner
release. 41 Although the traditional criteria for parole release are
phrased in terms of individual rehabilitation and community
safety, political pressure to reduce time served when prison
overcrowding occurs has influenced discretionary parole decisions.42 Recent legislation in many states, however, has re36. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 69; Blackmore, supra note 32, at 5;
Krajick, "Not on My Block": Local Opposition Impedes the Search for Alternatives,
CORRECTIONS MAG., Oct. 1980, at 15, 15-16.
37. Expending alternative treatment resources on minor offenders may merely
"widen the net of social control" by administering to those who otherwise might have
avoided official scrutiny. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 10; Blackmore, supra
note 32, at 13. See generally P. LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL
(1975).
38. See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 125, 129-31.
39. Id. at 122-24.
40. Cf. id. (reviewing the infrequent implementation of informal measures to regulate
intake and release of prisoners).
41. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 122-23.
42. Once an offender is sentenced to prison, the parole board generally determines
when he will be released. Id. This discretion has, on occasion, been influenced by political pressure resulting from prison overcrowding. Id.; A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN,
ABOLISH PAROLE? 14-16 (1978). See 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 123 (California

SPRING

1982]

Prison Overcrowding

555

stricted parole discretion and thus limited the value of accelerated parole as a prison management tool. •3
Prisoner release can also be regulated through executive clemency,•• expansion of good-time credits, and expansion of work
credits.n Executive clemency, although widely available, is infrequently used to regulate prison populations.•8 Similarly, work
credits and meritorious good-time credits have been employed to
accelerate release in only a handful of jurisdictions.47
2. Prisoner Intake- Prisoner intake, unlike release measures
which are generally enforced by the parole board, is subject to
the discretion of various government authorities. The legislature
retains, sole responsibility for formulating arrest procedure and
setting prison terms, yet enforcement of these policies rests with
prison population was lowered by the parole board in the early 1970's to reduce corrections expenditures); A. RUTHERFORD, PRISON POPULATIONS AND POLICY CHOICES 50-60, 7178, 185 (1977) (shifts in parole policy due to political pressure are believed to account for
declines in prison population in Illinois from 1962 to 1974, and in Iowa from 1971 to
1972). Court ordered prison population reductions in Mississippi led to a redefinition of
parole board policy and authority; the result was to permit "early parole" and "supervised earned release." Id. at 66-67.
43. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 123. Support for the discretionary standard
and the rehabilitative ideal have faded in the face of increasing acceptance of the "just
deserts" and "justice model" standards. Both of the latter standards propose reduction
of discretion in the criminal justice system through determinative sentences and decision-making guidelines. See generally FOGEL, supra note 17; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1975);
Rubin, New Sentencing Proposals and Laws in the 1970's, FED. PROBATION, June 1979,
at 3; von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overview,
27 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 289 (1981). By early 1980, 27 states had mandatory sentencing
laws for armed, violent, drug, or repeat offenses. See M. KANNENSOHN, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PAROLE-RELATED LEGISLATION ENACTED DURING THE 1979 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 10
(1979).
The concept of sentencing guidelines has been viewed, unlike proposals for legislatively fixed sentences, as a useful step toward the development of a common law of sentencing. See Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 739 (Zimring & Frase, eds. 1980); Krajick, Parole: Discretion is Out, Guidelines
are In, CORRECTIONS MAG., Dec. 1978, at 28, 28; Kress, Wilkins & Gottfredson, ls the
End of Judicial Sentencing in Sight?, 60 JUDICATURE 216, 219-22 (1976).
44. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 123; see generally R. GOLDFARB & L.
SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 316-58 (1973). Clemency includes executive pardon, commutation, reprieve, and amnesty. For the purposes of this Note, the most significant types
of clemency are the pardon, which either exempts a convicted offender from all punishment or removes the civil disabilities associated with his criminal convictions, and the
commutation, which lessens the severity of prescribed penalty. GOLDFARB & SINGER,
supra at 316.
45. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 123. Goodtime credits and the analogous
work credits were designed to aid prison management by encouraging good behavior. See
GoLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 44, at 262.
46. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 123.
47. Id.

a
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the police, prosecutors, and the courts. 48 This dispersal of authority makes intake measures an unwieldy and unreliable
mechanism for regulating prison populations.
In general, development of intake and release measures has
been inhibited by the misperception that these mechanisms pose
a threat to public safety. 49 The concept of early release stirs
popular fears of corrections facilities freeing unreformed
criminals into society. 6° Consequently, when money is available
to construct space for prisoners, the general public - acting
through its elected representatives - concludes frequently that
the risk to safety justifies further imprisonment. It is primarily
for this reason that regulation of prison population through intake and release measures has been neglected as an alternative
to alleviate overcrowding.

D.

Consequences of State Failure: Judicial Intervention

State failure to relieve prison overcrowding through prison
construction, expansion of community corrections, or ad hoc regulation of prisoner intake and release repeatedly has prompted
federal court intervention. Federal court decisions since the riots
at Attica in 1971111 have established firmly that "the Constitution does not stop at the prison gate. "H In instances where over48. Id.; M. ZALMAN, C. OSTROM, P. GUILLIAMS & G. PEASLEE, SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN
6-7 (1979) (contending that no one decision maker has complete control over sentencing
disposition) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN].
49. Cf. 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 1, at 136 (noting the cost of setting a prisoner free is difficult to determine, but the cost of prison construction is relatively easy to
calculate).
50. See Detroit Free Press, May 15, 1981, at 3, col. 2.
51. One of the worst prison disasters in United States history occurred at the Attica
State Correctional Facility in upstate New York in September of 1971. The disturbances
began on September 9, when a strike by members of a work detail errupted into violence
that spread rapidly throughout the prison. The rioters were eventually confined to one
cellblock and a yard, where they held more than 30 guards and civilian employees as
hostages. In subsequent negotiations, the prisoners made 30 demands, 28 of which concerned improvements in the prison. Efforts to negotiate proved unsuccessful. On September 13, convinced that the situation was deteriorating, the authorities ordered state
troopers, sheriff's deputies, and guards to storm the cellblock. Ten hostages and 29 inmates were killed during the assault. Two hostages were seriously injured by inmates.
The riots at Attica focused public attention on the many problems plaguing state correctional systems - including overcrowding. See generally T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE
(1975).
52. E.g., Battle v. Anderson, 447 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd, 564 F. 2d
388 (10th Cir. 1977) (overcrowding in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary and the
Oklahoma State Reformatory held violative of the constitution); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F.
Supp. 802, 813 (D. Ore. 1980) (overcrowding in the Oregon State Penitentiary, the Farm
Annex, and the Oregon State Correctional Institution violates constitutional standards);
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crowding has been especially grievous 113 federal courts have
abandoned traditional deference to state officials 114 and held entire state prison systems - or conditions in individual state
prisons - unconstitutional. 1111
see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (pretrial detainees have constitutional
rights); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (prisoners in prison disciplinary
proceedings have constitutional rights); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (upholding a prisoner's constitutional right to practice religous beliefs).
53. Prisons or prison systems in 28 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands are under court order based all or in part on overcrowding. See STATUS REPORT, supra note 20.
54. This deference, known as the "hands off' doctrine, has been abandoned by federal courts where prisoners have challenged living conditions as substandard. See note 52
and accompanying text supra. Under the "hands off'' doctrine, which was frequently
invoked until the mid-1960's, courts argued they lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear petitions challenging prison conditions. As a result, the administration of state correctional institutions was left entirely to the discretion of state officials. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506, 508-09 (1963).
Several commentators have reviewed the decline of the "hands off'' doctrine. See generally Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (1980);
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: a Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L REV. 473 (1971); Note, Equitable Remedies Available to a Federal
Court After Declaring an Entire Prison System Violates the Eighth Amendment, 1 CAP.
L. REV. 101 (1972); Comment, Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role of the
Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 CuM. L. REV. 31 (1976); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. REV. 367 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conditions of
Confinement].
55. See supra note 53.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), may
temper federal court intervention in state prison systems. The Court, considering for the
first time the restrictions which the eighth amendment places upon conditions in state
prisons, held "double celling" was not cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, explained: "Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize
claims of cruel and unusual confinement," Id. at 352, "[b)ut conditions that cannot be
said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary conditions are not unconstitutional. To
the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id. at 347.
Powell termed a 1977 district court ruling that double celling is "cruel and unusual"
for long-term prisoners in an otherwise properly run facility "an aspiration toward an
ideal environment for long-term confinement." Id. at 349. Accordingly, he dismissed the
significance of "rated capacity" figures as a means to determine when overpopulation has
reached unconstitutional proportions: "The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF [Southern Ohio Correctional Facility) guessed incorrectly about future
prison population, but whether the actual conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel
and unusual." Id. at 350-51 n.15. See generally Note, Eighth Amendment - A Significant Limit on Federal Court Activism in Ameliorating State Prison Conditions, 72 J. OF
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1345 (1981).
The decision may be too narrow to cripple other prison condition suits. Justice Brennan, concurring, wrote "to emphasize that today's decision should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of prison conditions .... " Chapman,
452 U.S. at 353. "[J]udicial intervention has been responsible, not only for remedying
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Persistent judicial intervention, however, has not always
proved beneficial. On the one hand, judicial involvement has
served as a catalyst for upgrading prison conditions. 66 On the
other hand, the judiciary's tendency to become a surrogate jail
superintendent67 has antagonized prison officials, endangering
joint efforts among courts, prison administrators, and legislatures to improve prison conditions. Without the good will and
cooperation of prison officials, courts cannot compel adoption of
prison reform. 68 Judicial intervention, therefore, is best used
only as a last resort.
some of the worst abuses by direct order, but for 'forcing the legislative branch of government to reevaluate correction policies and to appropriate funds for upgrading penal
systems.' " Id. at 359, quoting 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND
JAILS 163 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 3 AMERICAN PRISONS]. Indeed, Brennan argued for
less deference on the part of the federal courts than Powell, because many conditions of
confinement, including overcrowding, "arise from neglect rather than policy. There is no
reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of officials who Jack the resources or motivation to operate prisons
within limits of decency." Chapman, 452 U.S. at 362.
Lower courts have managed to distinguish Chapman on its facts. See, e.g., Smith v.
Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186 (C.D. Ill. 1981) (double celling at Pontiac Correctional Center
held cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment); see generally
Cohen, The Lucasville Ruling: "The Constitution Does Not Mandate Comfortable Pris·
ons", CORRECTIONS MAG., Aug. 1981, at 50, 51 (noting facts which distinguish Chapman
from other prison condition cases). But see Note, supra at 1373 (concluding that Chap·
man undermines the totality of circumstances test by limiting the eighth amendment
inquiry to whether prison conditions currently deny inmates a "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities").
Nevertheless, the decision in Chapman may discourage prison expenditures and reforms by complacent state legislatures. See Cohen, supra at 50 (arguing that Chapman is
not very significant legally, but may be disastrous politically). John Manson, Connecticut
Commissioner of Corrections, contends that imaginative programs to reduce prison
populations "will kind of slip by the wayside, because they'll just look at Chapman and
say, 'just cram another one in a cell.' It will put a crimp in legislation which attempts to
deal with overcrowding." Id. at 51.
56. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring); 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra
note 55, at 163. See Conditions of Confinement, supra note 54, at 369-70; Gettinger,
"Cruel and Unusual" Punishment, CORRECTIONS MAG., Dec. 1977, at 3, 3. But see
Schuster & Widmer, Judicial Intervention in Corrections: A Case Study, FEo. PROBA·
TION, Sept. 1978, at 10, 11-16 (noting that prison conditions litigation rarely results in
improved conditions).
Congress specifically recognized the benefits of court intervention when it passed the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1977 (Supp. IV 1980). The Act
authorizes the United States Attorney General to bring suit in federal court on behalf of
institutionalized persons who have been forced to endure unconstitutional conditions.
See H.R. REP. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1980).
57. See Kaufman, Prison Reform: A View from the Bench, 67 A.B.A. J. 1470, 1470-71
(1981) (arguing it is not in the best interest of the judiciary or corrections officials for
courts to encroach unduly on the state's role in managing prisons).
58. Id.; see Schuster & Widmer, supra note 56, at 16 (concluding that even when no
bad faith is involved, poor communication and failure to understand correctional bureaucracy have impeded court ordered reform).
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MICHIGAN'S APPROACH TO PRISON OVERCROWDING

Severe overcrowding has plagued Michigan's prison system
since 1975. 119 Prompted by fears of prison riots80 and federal
court intervention,81 Governor William G. Milliken and the state
legislature appointed a Joint Legislative/Executive Task Force
on Prison Overcrowding in January of 1980 to examine the situ59. REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE/EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE ON PRISON OVERCROWDING i, app. (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING] (on file with
the Journal of Law Reform). Michigan's prison system has been overcrowded by as
many as 2,000 prisoners since 1975. Three weeks before the REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING was issued, the state housed 15,095 prisoners, 1,628 more than the system's
recommended capacity. Id.
The causes of overcrowding in Michigan include longer sentences, fixed sentences
under a new gun law, and a decrease in good-time credits. The average time spent in
detention in Michigan state prisons increased by 45% from 22 months to over 32 months
between 1970 and 1980. State officials estimate that such an increase in average sentence
requires an additional 5,000 beds in the prison system. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra at app.
The "two year gun law" generally provides that a person in possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony shall be sentenced to a mandatory, concurrent two
year prison term. Second and third convictions carry five and ten year terms. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.227(b) (1979).
Proposal B, approved by voters in November 1978, made good-time credits unavailable
to offenders convicted under a long list of statutes until the minimum sentence had been
served. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.233b (Supp. 1981). State officials estimate that if
judicial sentencing patterns do not change, the statute will result in average sentence
increases of 20 months for 53% of the prison population. Esquina & Pasman, Much to
Do About Good Time, 58 MICH. B. J. 28, 29 (1979).
60. See REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 22:
[One] implication of an overcrowded prison system, perhaps the most dangerous and costly, is that of prison riots and disruptions. Since January 1, 1980,
there has been a major prison riot and a series of minor prison disturbances
across the nation. Although, with the exception of the New Mexico riot, they
have not been serious, they do indicate the prevailing mood of the prison population in this country: unrest.
Reports indicate that overcrowding contributed to riots which occurred in May 1981 at
the State Prison of Southern Michigan (Jackson), the Michigan Reformatory at Ionia,
and the Marquette Branch Prison. See note 5 supra.
61. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 22 ("These living conditions
create a situation that invites judicial intervention - a situation occuring on a large
scale across the country.").
State officials became especially concerned about the threat of federal court intervention following Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (state prison
treatment and rehabilitation programs held violative of the fourteenth amendment).
Boyd Inverview I, supra note 16. Several months after the issuance of the Task Force
Report, a state circuit court confronted the overcrowding problem. Human Rights Party
v. Michigan Corrections Commission, No. 76-19088-AA, slip op. (Ingham County Cir. Ct.
Oct. 27, 1980). The court proposed a series of remedial measures should population continue to exceed prison system capacity: requesting the parole board to exercise its discretion in favor of parole; expanding the use of community-based facilities; transferring offenders to county jails. Id. Although the court retained jurisdiction to meet these terms
or make other orders as necessary, it has taken no further action.
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ation. The Task Force proposed both short- and long-term solutions to the overcrowding crisis. 62 The final recommendation 62. The Task Force recommendations included:
(1) continued funding of five prison facilities and construction of three additional regional facilities. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 18.
Three of the approved facilities were completed by the fall of 1981.
(2) Enactment of Michigan House Bill 4106 as a site selection process for correctional
facilities. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 17. Although not related
directly to the overpopulation problem, the creation of a formal process for community
involvement in site selection was needed to reinforce the credibility of the Department of
Corrections in locating sites and to facilitate the development of public support for a site
once it had been located. Id.
This bill was enacted into law in 1980. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.216 (Supp. 1981).
(3) Initiation of a referendum to provide an income tax increase earmarked for prison
construction. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 19-20. The increase
was proposed for a five year period and was expected to derive an annual revenue of
approximately $52 million. Id. at 19.
The increase was later defeated in a statewide referendum in November 1980. Detroit
News, Nov. 6, 1980, at 3, col. 6.
(4) Expansion of community residential and alternative programs. REPORT ON PRISON
OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 2-3. At the time of the Task Force Report, 1,763 residents, representing 12% of the total inmate population, were in community based programs. The Report recommended expansion of community residential programs - facilities holding pre-release prisoners - to a population capacity of 2,000. Id.
Shortly after the Task Force Report was issued, however, community residential program population was expanded to capacity. In addition, the growth of community alternative programs was halted by budget cuts in the Department of Corrections. Light Interview, supra note 16.
(5) Development of departmental rules to broaden and clarify the authority and availability of restitution and community service orders as conditions of probation. REPORT
ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 4. Restitution, in conjunction with probation, was permitted by statute in Michigan. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 771.3 (1979). Community service orders were not specifically permitted, although some courts used them.
These measures, according to the Task Force, were underutilized.
The authority and availability of restitution and community service orders as a condition of probation have since been broadened and clarified by statute. See MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 771.3 (Supp. 1981).
(6) Extension of available jail time in conjunction with probation from six months to
one year. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 5. At the time of the
Report, judges were restricted by statute from granting probation in conjunction with a
sentence of more than six months in jail. The Task Force expected this proposal to reduce the number of short term commitments to state prisons.
In 1980 the recommendation was codified in Michigan law. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 771.3(2)(a) (Supp. 1981).
(7) Enactment of financial incentives to encourage the development of alternative correctional facilities. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 6.
This proposal is presently pending before the Corrections Committee of the Michigan
Legislature. See H.B. 4418, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981).
(8) Creation of a full-time, non-civil service liason position within the Department of
Corrections. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 7. This recommendation was designed to offer judges, prosecutors, the Department, and other local officials a
means to communicate and develop ideas for innovative community-based correctional
programs. Id.
(9) Implementation of sentencing guidelines to remedy the disparity in Michigan's
sentencing system. Id. at 9. This proposal was designed to grant judges the option of
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enacted into law as the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers
Act68 - took the form of a "last-resort" statutory ·measure
designed to reduce Michigan's prison population during prison
following the recommended sentence or imposing their own. If judges revised sentence
guidelines so that imprisonment was recommended for fewer felons, or reduced guideline
sentence durations, the net result would be to ease the state's overcrowding problem. Id.;
see generally SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN, supra note 48 (discussing sentence disparity in
Michigan and recommending sentence guidelines).
(10) Adoption of the Michigan Second Revised Criminal Code (Final Draft 1979). REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 10. The proposed code codifies approximately 3,500 sections of existing law, as well as proposing new procedures that will ameliorate the overcrowding crisis. Among the provisions are presumptive sentencing and
appellate review of sentences. These are expected to reduce disparities in sentence length
under Michigan's indeterminate sentencing system and thus lessen the burden on state
prisons. Id. The proposed code also clarifies the availability of alternatives to
incarceration.
(11) Amendment of the presumption in the parole board statute to favor the prisoner.
Id. at 13. The decision to grant parole is governed by M1cH. CoMP. LAWS § 791.233
(1979), which requires that the prisoner prove he poses no threat to society. The Task
Force proposed that the burden of proof be shifted so that the parole board would be
required to justify a denial of parole by demonstrating that the prisoner had a poor
prison record or a history of criminal activity. Absent this showing the prisoner would be
paroled upon the expiration of his minimum sentence, minus good time where applicable. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 13.
The Supreme Court in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), may
have foreclosed the benefits of this proposal by ruling that parole statutes which establish a presumption of parole may create an expectancy of release requiring some measure
of constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause.
Legislation, however, is pending to streamline parole board procedures and remove
some delays. H.B. 4162, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1981).
(12) Intensive administrative review of prisoner files to assure that all prisoners eligible for release are identified in a timely fashion. REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING,
supra note 59, at 14.
The enactment of the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act did result in a
more timely review of prisoner files. See infra notes 109 & 110 and accompanying text.
(13) Expansion of parole board and probation administrative staff to the extent necessary to implement the recommendations and maintain administrative efficieqcy. REPORT
ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 15.
63. M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 800.71-.79 (Supp. 1981). See REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59, at 21-24. Governor Milliken signed the bill, introduced as H.B.
6049, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1980), on January 26, 1981. Despite its seemingly controversial nature, the bill passed with little opposition. This may be explained in part by the
Human Rights Party court order, see supra note 61. Studies comparing the cost of implementing the court order with the cost of implementing the proposed Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act concluded that the latter was more cost-effective. See
Department of Corrections Memorandum, Hotchkiss Court Order vs. POEPA (Nov. 6,
1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Interview with James Boyd, Aide to the
House Corrections Committee and Member of the Task Force on Prison Overcrowding,
in Lansing (Mar. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Boyd Interview II]; see also House Fiscal
Agency Memorandum from Dick McKean to Rep. David Hollister (Oct. 30, 1980) (reviewing the cost of implementing the court order) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Interview with Perry Johnson, Director of the Department of Corrections, in Lansing (Mar. 30, 1982) (noting that the court order was not attractive to corrections officials
and legislators and thus created a favorable climate for the bill's unobstructed passage)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson Interview].
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overcrowding "states of emergency.""

A.

The Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act

The Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act establishes a
four-step procedure for reducing state prison population to rated
design capacity. 81 To trigger the Act, the prison system" population must exceed rated design capacity87 for thirty consecutive
days. Once this initial condition is met, the State Corrections
Commission certifies that fact to the governor. 88 The Commission must also certify that all administrative remedies89 have
been exhausted. 70
·
Following certification, the governor is required to declare a
state of emergency within fifteen days. During the state of emergency the sentences of all prisoners serving established minimum prison terms under the state's indeterminate sentencing
laws71 are reduced by ninety days. 71 Shortening minimum
64. The Task Force emphasized that the Act would be implemented only if other
legislation and executive efforts to reduce prison population did not eliminate overcrowding. REPORT ON PRISON OvERcROWDING, supra note 59, at 22.
65. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 800.71-.77 (Supp. 1981).
66. "Prison system" is defined as all correctional facilities operated by the Department of Corrections, other than community corrections centers or residential homes.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.72(b)-(c) (Supp. 1981).
67. "Rated design capacity" is defined as available bedspace that has been certified
by the Corrections Commission, subject to applicable federal and state laws. MlcH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.72(d) (Supp. 1981).
The Corrections Commission calculated "rated design capacity" based on the original
design capacity of the prisons plus the additional space that had been made available
through the use of temporary housing. Rated design capacity at the time the bill was
passed was 12,874, as certified by the Corrections Commission. Letter from Florence
Crane, Chairwoman of the Corrections Commission, to Governor William G. Milliken
(Mar. 30, 1981) (requesting declaration of a prison overcrowding state of emergency)
[hereinafter cited as Crane Letter] (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
Rated design capacity after January 1, 1984 will not include trailers, modular unite, or
other bedspace used as temporary housing for prisoners. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §
800.78(2) (Supp. 1981).
68. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 800.73 (Supp. 1981).
69. No statutory criteria were established to determine what constituted exhaustion
of administrative remedies under MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.73 (Supp. 1981). The
operative language of the Act states merely that "all administrative actions consistent
with applicable State laws" must be exhausted. Id. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
70. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.73 (Supp. 1981).
71. MICH. CONST. art. 4. § 45 states: "The legislature may provide for indeterminate
sentences as punishment for crime and for the detention and release of persons imprisoned or detained under such sentences."
The legislature has declared that when sentencing a felon for the first time, a court
must not fix a definite term of imprisonment, but rather should set both a minimum and
maximum term. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 769.8 (1979). This indeterminate sentencing provi-
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sentences in this manner creates a larger pool of prisoners eligible for release on parole. Upon approval of these additional applications, the reduced sentences will decrease the size of the
prison population. 78 .The governor need not declare the emergency, however, if within fifteen calendar days of the request he
finds that the Commission acted in error. 74
Should the ninety-day sentence rollback not reduce prison
system population to ninety-five percent of rated capacity
within ninety days of the declaration of the state of emergency,
minimum sentences of all prisoners incarcerated in state prisons
on that date will be reduced by an additional ninety days. 76 This
"second stage" reduction will enlarge once again the pool of prisoners eligible for parole. As in the "first stage," the governor
must rescind the state of emergency if at any point during the
process the Corrections Commission certifies that the prison
population has been reduced to ninety-five percent of rated desion, however, does not apply to any person convicted of an offense for which the only
punishment prescribed is life imprisonment. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.9(1) (1979).
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.74 (Supp. 1981). The Department of Corrections
has interpreted this section to apply to all state prisoners except those serving life
sentences, a flat sentence under the felony firearm law, prisoners released on court orders, and escapees and parolees. State prisoners in local jails or federal facilities under a
contract with the Department of Corrections and those who have been committed to
mental health facilities are eligible for sentence reduction. Prisoners in corrections centers and residential homes are also eligible. Memorandum from the Department of Corrections, Executive Office, to All Michigan Prisoners (Mar. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum to Prisoners) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). See also Department of Corrections, Director's Office Memorandum 1981-5 to Bureau Heads, Regional
Administrators, Wardens and Superintendents (Mar. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Director's Office Memorandum] (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
State prisoners who earn good time credit will have 90 days reduced from their special
. good time minimum sentences. Those who cannot earn good time credit because they fall
under Proposal B, see supra note 59, or the Habitual Offender Statute, MICH. CoMP.
LAWS § 769.10-.12 (1979), will have 90 days deducted from their calendar minimums.
Memorandum to Prisoners, supra. But see People ex rel. Oakland Prosecuting Atty. v.
Bureau of Pardons and Paroles, 78 Mich. App. 111, 259 N.W.2d 385 (1977) (prisoner
sentenced under habitual offender statute may not be released on parole prior to expiration of minimum sentence imposed by the sentencing judge in absence of written consent
of the judge or his successor). Offenders·who enter or return to the prison system while
the emergency is in effect are eligible for the reduction of sentence minimums. Memorandum to Prisoners, supra.
73. See Memorandum from House Corrections Committee and Speaker Bobby Crim
to Members of the Michigan Legislature (Mar. 31, 1981) [hereinafter cited as House
Memorandum] (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
74. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.74 (Supp. 1981).
75. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.75 (Supp. 1981). This section does not distinguish
between prisoners whose sentence minimums were already reduced under the first stage
and prisoners whose minimums will be reduced for the first time. As a result, all eligible
prisoners will receive sentence reductions. Boyd Interview I, supra note 16.
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sign capacity. 78 The governor need not declare an end to the
emergency if he finds the Commission erred in requesting the
rescission of the state of emergency. 77
Finally, the Act contains three important provisos which apply throughout all phases of sentence reduction. First, new
prison housing must have only single occupancy rooms or cells
and must comply with state and federal standards for new
prison housing and facilities. 78 Second, temporary housing is to
be excluded from rated design capacity after January 1, 1984.79
Third, the Act will not take effect if prison population exceeds
rated design capacity as a direct result of loss of bedspace due to
a natural disaster or deliberate destruction of property. 80
76. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.77 (Supp. 1981).
77. Id. The governor must find such an error within 15 calendar days of the Commission's request, or rescind the emergency. Id.
78. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.78(1) (Supp. 1981). After January 26, 1981, all new
housing, as well as facilities purchased, leased, constructed, or converted by the Department of Corrections for use as a prison, must contain only single occupancy rooms or
cells and comply with all applicable federal and state laws and the rules and regulations
promulgated under those laws. Id.
79. M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.78(2) (Supp. 1981). Rated design capacity after
January 1, 1984 will not include temporary housing. Id.; see supra note 67. Task Force
members agreed that temporary housing was undesirable and that it was important to
set standards for housing. Boyd Interview II, supra note 63. The Department of Corrections advocated these changes in large part because double celling and temporary housing make efficient management of the prison system more difficult. Johnson Interview,
supra note 63.
80. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.79 (Supp. 1981). The central intent of this section
is to eliminate any incentive for prisoners to destroy property so as to trigger the sentence reduction provisions of the Act. Interview with Rep. Jeffrey D. Padden, Chairman
of the Task Force on Prison Overcrowding and the House Corrections Committee, in
Lansing (Mar. 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Padden Interview]; Boyd Interview II,
supra note 63.
When bedspace is destroyed, the Corrections Commission must determine whether the
loss resulted from a natural disaster or deliberate destruction. Although the governor has
been granted no explicit authority to challenge this determination he may reject the
Commission's request for a state of emergency. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
The Michigan prison riots in 1981, see supra notes 5 & 60, illustrate how the proviso
operates. During the riots, 150 beds were destroyed. The Commission concluded that the
property was destroyed deliberately and, consequently, the rated design capacity was not
reduced to reflect the loss. Deliberate destruction will not, however, preclude implementation of the Act if the prison population exceeds the unchanged rated design capacity.
One problem with the proviso is that it may permit overcrowded conditions to continue indefinitely without remedy. When bedspace is destroyed deliberately, rated design
capacity does not reflect the actual capacity of the prison; on paper, the prison will appear to have more beds than it actually does.
The problem, however, need not prove fatal. For example, the majority of beds lost
during the 1981 riots were located in temporary housing and thus will not be included in
rated design capacity calculations after January 1, 1984. See supra note 79. The drafters
of the proviso were well aware that one effect of this safeguard would be to increase
overcrowding, yet they concluded that the proviso was necessary to ensure that the Act
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B. Implementation of the Act
The Act was first employed on March 30, 1981, when the Corrections Commission notified Governor Milliken that the prison
population had exceeded its capacity for thirty consecutive
days81 and requested he declare the state's first prison overcrowding state of emergency. 82 Although a lawsuit challenging
the Act's constitutionality delayed the declaration,83 the Governor announced a state of emergency on May 20, 1981, and thus
triggered the first reduction stage. 114
The Department of Corrections estimated that the first
ninety-day sentence rollback would make approximately 1500
prisoners eligible for parole. 811 Basing their predictions on the
parole board's sixty percent approval rate for first appearance
prisoner review, the Department calculated that the Act would
result in the release of a thousand prisoners who would not otherwise have become eligible for parole during the ninety-day pewould be triggered only by "system-created" overpopulation. Padden Interview, supra;
Johnson Interview, supra note 63; Boyd Interview II, supra note 63.
81. Crane Letter, supra note 67. The state's prisons were 175 prisoners above the
rated design· capacity of 12,874 on that date. Department of Corrections, Temporary
Emergency Capacity Data by Week (Sept. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as TEC Data] (on
file with the Journal of Law Reform).
82. Crane Letter, supra note 67.
83. The Governor was unable to declare a state of emergency within the statutory
time period; an Oakland Circuit Court restraining order delayed the declaration. The
restraining order, issued in response to a lawsuit filed by the Oakland County Prosecutor
challenging the constitutionality of the Act, was subsequently vacated and the court dismissed the complaint. Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney v. Dept. of Corrections, No.
81-221225 CZ, slip op. (Oakland County Cir. Ct. Apr. 22, 1981). The Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed on the grounds that the statute improperly grapted powers to the Department of Corrections that should have remained exclusively within the purview of the
governor. No. 57297, slip op. (Mich. App. Apr. 30, 1981).
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 411 Mich. 183, 305 N.W.2d 515 (1981) (per curiam). The court
held that the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act was within the authority
granted to the legislature by the constitution, see MlcH. CONST. art. 4, § 45, and therefore
did not constitute an encroachment upon the governor's commutation power. Id. at 19495. After examining the Act's legislative history, the court concluded that it was designed
as part of a broad-based program of correctional reform and was not formulated to usurp
executive authority. Id. at 197.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, on May 20, the Corrections Commission certified that the prison was overcrowded and had exceeded rated design capacity for 69
days. After announcing that all administrative actions consistent with applicable state
laws had been exhausted, the Commission again requested that the Governor declare a
state of emergency. Department of Corrections News Advisory (May 20, 1981) (on file
with the Journal of Law Reform).
84. Exec. Order No. 1981-4, 1981 Mich. Legis. Serv. 398 (West).
85. Department of Corrections, Press Release (Mar. 30, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
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riod. 88 The second reduction stage, if needed, was expected to
make an additional 1,400 prisoners eligible for parole.87 Of that
number, the Department predicted 850 would actually receive
parole. 88
Although the prison system was overcrowded by 237 prisoners
when the state of emergency was declared, state officials hoped
to parole approximately a thousand prisoners over the ninetyday period because new prisoner commitments would fill most of
the vacated space. 88 State officials expected one-half to twothirds of the prisoners released to come from community-based
programs.90 As bedspace in community corrections facilities became available, eligible institutional prisoners would be transferred, thereby reducing total prison population.
The state of emergency lasted until August 24, 1981.91 During
86. Interview with William Kime, Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections
Bureau of Programs, in Lansing (Mar. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Kime Interview];
Department of Corrections Memorandum from Bill Kime to Director Johnson [hereinafter cited as Kime Memorandum] (June 2, 1980) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform).
87. See Kime Interview, supra note 86; Kime Memorandum, supra note 86.
88. House Memorandum, supra note 73, at 3. This prediction may be excessive because the Department of Corrections failed initially to recognize the degree to which the
Act's language limits eligibility in the second stage. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
89. House Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5. If the Act required that the number of
actual paroles be equivalent to the number of prisoners by which the system is overcrowded, prison population would remain at least equal to rated capacity. The prison
system, therefore, would become overcrowded with each new commitment and the Act
would continually come into play. As a result, prisoners would become eligible for parole
far earlier than intended by the Act's drafters. Id.
90. Id.; see Department of Corrections, PreBB Release (May 14, 1981) (Perry Johnson,
Director of the Department of Corrections, stated: "Using this new act is a responsible
way to safely reduce prison population. It will not unduly threaten the safety of the
community since all of the people to be paroled under this new act would have been
paroled within 90 days anyway. Most of the prisoners paroled will be from our state's
half-way houses and minimum security prisons."). Governor Milliken stated:
I think there is the impreBSion among some that 1,000 hardened criminals are
going to be released from Jackson Prison tomorrow. There will be some persons
paroled from the institutions but most will come from minimum security, and
this will not happen immediately. Field investigations must be made and parole
plans approved by the Parole Board . . . . I might point out that we normally
parole about 4,500 people a year: that is simply the flow through the system. Use
of this act will probably mean we parole 5,500 instead of 4,500. This isn't a cataclysmic event. The only thing particularly unique about this is the particular
safety valve we are using. I would remind people again that the only people released as a result of this act will be people who would have been released within
90 days in any case.
Department of Corrections, PreBS Release (May 20, 1981) (on file with the Journal of
Law Reform).
91. Exec. Order No. 1981-6, 1981 Mich. Legis. Serv. 751 (West). The request to rescind the prison overcrowding state of emergency was formulated on August 13, 1981 at
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that time 875 prisoners received early parole. 92 Between 500 and
600 of those prisoners would not have been released during that
period but for the implementation of the Act. The remaining
275 to 375 prisoners carried minimum prison terms that would
have elapsed at some point during the state of emergency, but
because of the Act were paroled slightly before the expiration of
their original minimum sentences. 93 As expected, the vast majority of prisoners released came from community-based programs
rather than from institutions. 94
After the state of emergency was rescinded in August, 1981,911
the Commission's regular monthly meeting after the Commission certified that the population of the state's prison system had fallen below 95'};, of rated design capacity. The
request was immediately sent to the Governor. Department of Corrections, Press Release
(Aug. 14, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). If population had not dropped
to 95';;, capacity by August 18, the second stage of sentence reductions would have been
triggered. Id.
92. Addendum to August 1981 Monthly Report to the Director and the Corrections
Commission (Sept. 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Addendum to 1981 Report) (on file
with the Journal of Law Reform). Corrected release figures are noted in Minutes of the
Meeting of the Joint Committee to Investigate Prison Disturbances (Aug. 19, 1981) at 3,
in INVESTIGATION OF PRISON DISTURBANCES, supra note 5, at app.
The long term impact of sentence reductions during this state of emergency is not
known. An estimated 8,000 prisoners received minimum sentence reductions, and until
they are paroled it will be difficult to determine the total impact. Id.
93. Interview with Edward Turner, Chairman of the Parole Board, in Lansing (Oct.
8, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Turner Interview I); Kime Interview, supra note 86; Letter
from Gail R. Light, Public Information Director of the Department of Corrections, to
Senator John McCune, Oklahoma State Senate (Oct. 28, 1981) at 2 (describing the implementation of the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act) [hereinafter cited as
Light Letter) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
94. See Addendum to 1981 Report, supra note 92 (651 early releases during the state
of emergency were from community residential programs).
95. Although state prison population was reduced to 95% capacity during the first
stage of sentence reductions, fewer prisoners were released than anticipated. Compare
supra notes 86 & 93 and accompanying text. The disparity is the result of mistaken
calulation. First, the Department of Corrections predicted the Act's impact based upon
the average number of all paroles, rather than those paroled upon fulfilling their minimum sentences only; second, estimates were based upon 1979 figures, as opposed to 1980
figures where eligibility had been reduced by statutory limitations on good-time credit.
Minutes of the Joint Committee to Investigate Prison Disturbances (Aug. 19, 1981) at 3,
in INVESTIGATION OF PRISON DISTURBANCES, supra note 5.
Increased prison commitments and longer sentences also may have accounted for a
slower decline in population than was expected. Detroit News, Aug. 16, 1981, § 2, at 8,
col. 12; see also Detroit News, Mar. 31, 1981, § 2, at 1, col. 5 (the climb in prison commitments may have been the result of Michigan's high unemployment rate).
Certification of the recently constructed Ypsilanti Maximum Security Prison and expansion of community residential programs during the state of emergency were of crucial
importance in achieving the 95% capacity requirement and averting implementation of
the second stage of sentence reductions. Interview with John Frye, Supervisor of the
Department of Corrections Audit Control and Records Section, in Lansing (Mar. 5, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Frye Interview I). Addition of the Ypsilanti prison increased rated
design capacity of the prison system to 13,285 and raised the 95% capacity mark to
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state prison population began to climb again. 96 While the population temporarily exceeded rated design capacity in January
1982, it did not remain above capacity long enough to trigger the
Act again.97 Corrections officials, however, still expect a prison
overcrowding state of emergency to arise during 1982 that will
necessitate further reduction of prison sentences.98
Ill.

EVALUATING THE PRISON OVERCROWDING EMERGENCY
POWERS ACT

A.

Benefits

Although the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act has
not been tested extensively, it is apparent that this statutory
method of regulating prison population holds many advantages
over the traditional approaches to prison overcrowding. The
costs of implementing the Act are far less than any other alternative under consideration.99 Indeed, future declarations of a
prison overcrowding emergency should entail less expense than
the initial declaration due to adjustments made in the Department of Corrections' parole review schedule and records. 100
12,620. Department of Corrections, Press Release (Aug. 14, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). Furthermore, despite the claim that community residential programs could not be expanded beyond a capacity of 2,000 prisoners without "undue risk
to public safety," Light Interview, supra note 16, the community programs population
was enlarged to 2,262 on August 19, 1981. Untitled and undated document compiled by
John Frye, Supervisor of the Department of Corrections Audit Control and Records Section (charting weekly prison population from Jan. 9, 1981 to Mar. 17, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Frye Compiled Statistics] (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). It was during that week that the prison overcrowding state of emergency was rescinded. Department of Corrections, Press Release (Aug. 14, 1981) (prison population reduced to 12,407
on August 12 - 213 prisoners under the amended 95% capacity requirement) (on file
with the Journal of Law Reform).
96. See TEC Data, supra note 81.
97. See Department of Corrections, Press Release (Feb. 1, 1982) (prison population
reached 13,306 on January 27, 1982, 15 persons above the rated capacity of 13,291) (on
file with the Journal of Law Reform); Frye Compiled Statistics, supra note 95.
98. Johnson Interview, supra note 63; Interview with Edward Turner, Chairman of
the Parole Board, in Lansing (Mar. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Turner Interview II].
99. Interview with Alvin Whitfield, Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections Bureau of Administrative Services, in Lansing (Mar. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Whitfield Interview]. Cost considerations include the lost working hours of personnel
loaned to the parole board by other departments, and out-of-pocket expenditures. No
record was kept of the loaned time. The only significant out-of-pocket expenses involved
payment of overtime wages to data processing operators. The total cost of administrative
processing did not exceed $10,000. Id.
100. Id.; Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
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Equally important, the Act does not ignore substantive correctional reform; it maintains strict standards for new prison housing and facilities. 101 All new housing must have single occupancy
rooms or cells and must comply with state and federal lawsm
and temporary housing is not to be included when assessing
rated design capacity after January, 1984.1°8
Furthermore, the Act is designed to achieve immediate prison
population reductions without compromising public safety. The
statute excludes prisoners serving life sentences and flat
sentences wider the felony firearm law from eligibility. 104 Onehalf to two-thirds of the prisoners likely to be released will come
from community-based programs where they have been screened
to ensure successful re-entry into society.1°0 In addition, all released prisoners will be within several months of parole. Thus,
advancing the date of release is not apt to imperil public safety.
Indeed, a recidivism study suggests that early release prisoners
are likely to commit only a negligible percentage of total felonies
in a given year.1 06
Finally, because the Act guarantees immediate relief to prisons - even while a protracted debate on prison reform is pending - court involvement in prison management is minimized. 107
With the spectre of judicial intervention removed, legislators
have an opportunity to develop cost-effective, systemic reforms.

B. Potential Problems with the Act
Despite the Act's benefits, its use generates several potential
101. See supra notes 78 & 79.
102. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.78(1) (Supp. 1981).
103. · MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.78(2) (Supp. 1981).
104. See supra note 72.
105. House Memorandum, supra note 73; see supra note 90. Six hundred and fifty.
one of the 875 prisoners released during the state of emergency in 1981 came from community residential programs. Addendum to 1981 Report, supra note 92. See Department
of Corrections, Press Release (Sept. 24, 1980) and Department of Corrections, Press Release (Sept. 24, 1980), infra note 140. But see Light Letter, infra note 140.
106. Department of Corrections, Impact of 1981 E.P.A. Releases on Serious Crime
(undated) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). This preliminary study indicated
that 117 prisoners who received early parole under the Act were arrested for state police
index crimes in 1981 before their original minimum sentence expired. When compared
with 1980 index arrest totals for the entire state population, the early parole total represents only two-tenths of one percent of all 1980 arrests. Id. The study reflects the arrests
of all prisoners who received an early release during the entire year, not just those released during the state of emergency. State police index crimes consist of murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.
107. Padden Interview, supra note 80.
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problems. None, however, should be deemed serious enough to
justify abandoning the early release concept.
1. Impact on Correctional Administration- Implementation
of the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act has affected
traditional correctional administration in two important areas.
First, the Act places new burdens on the correctional administrative process. When implemented in 1981, it caused an increase in the number of prisoner files requiring screening, updating, and verification. 108 In addition, the Department of
Corrections was forced to prepare eligibility reports nine months
prior to the expiration date of a prisoner's minimum sentence rather than the customary six - to accomodate expected alterations in minimum sentences. 109 This change added to the burden
of an already overworked administrative staff. While the field
staff completed parole investigations at a rate nearly twice its
normal load 110 and the parole board heard cases at about twice
the ordinary rate, m the administrative staff worked overtime
and was forced to requisition clerical staff from other departments to meet the increased workload. m Nevertheless, despite
the strains the Act placed on correctional administration, the
additional costs needed to implement the Act were not prohibitive; total administrative expenses did not exceed $10,000. 118
Second, the Act may have affected adversely the application
of legal standards in parole board hearings. In general, the decision to release a prisoner on parole rests entirely within the dis108. Turner Interview I, supra note 93; Light Letter, supra note 93. See generally
Director's Office Memorandum, supra note 72. The procedures used to implement the
Act included: a computer search to determine prisoners eligible for sentence reductions;
computer production of revised time slips; computer control runs; distribution of revised
time slips to counsellors and prisoners, as well as to prisons and the Department of Corrections in Lansing. Interview with John Frye, Supervisor of the Department of Corrections Audit Control and Records Section, in Lansing (Mar. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Frye Interview II]. Files were manually altered by Department of Corrections personnel
in the prisons and the central office. Id.
109. Turner Interview I, supra note 93. Prior to the Act's passage, parole eligibility
reports were prepared six months before expiration of the prisoners' minimum sentences
in order to allow adequate time for investigation by field staff into the parole plan. Id.
This fulfilled state requirements that each prisoner receive a parole hearing before the
Board at least one month prior to the eligibility date. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 791.235
(1979); Lane v. Department of Corrections, 383 Mich. 50, 173 N.W.2d 209 (1970). Preparation of parole eligibility reports nine months before each prisoner's minimum sentence
was scheduled to expire ensured that there would be no administrative delays in releasing prisoners when the Act was invoked. Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
110. Light Letter, supra note 93; Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
111. Light Letter, supra note 93; Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
112. Light Letter, supra note 93; Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
113. See supra note 98.
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cretion of the parole board. 114 The board, however, does adhere
to legislative guidelines which stipulate that no person may be
released on parole "until the Board has reasonable assurance
. . . that the prisoner will not become a menace to society or to
the public."1111 Immediately preceeding and during the state of
emergency there were large increases in the quantity of parole
reports and hearings. 1111 Although the number of paroles during
this period varied only slightly from the normal sixty percent
approval rate, 117 the length and quality of board hearings may
have suffered as a result of the influx of prisoners eligible for
parole. 118 The parole board chairman, however, claimed that the
state of emergency did not alter application of legal standards
for parole review; 119 in his view reports and hearings were adequate, despite the markedly increased workload of corrections
officials. 110
114. M1cH. CoMP. LAWS § 791.235 (1979); Lane v. Department of Corrections, 383
Mich. 50, 60, 173 N.W.2d 209, 213 (1970).
115. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 791.233(1)(a) (1979). Before granting a parole release, the
Board must have "satisfactory evidence that arrangements have been made for such honorable and useful employment as the prisoner is capable of performing, or for the prisoner's education, or for the prisoner's care if the prisoner is mentally or physically ill or
incapacitated." M1cH. CoMP. LAws § 791.233(1)(c) (1979).
In addition, the Department of Corrections General Rules provide criteria to assist the
parole board in deciding whether to grant parole. The criteria include: criminal history,
behavior in prison, and job skills. MICH. ADMIN. CoDE R. 791.7715 (1979). The Board is
encouraged to examine the totality of the circumstances before reaching a decision. DEPARTMENT 01" CORRECTIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND COMMENTARY VII-7 (1976) (commentary to R. 791.7715).
116. See supra notes 110 & 111 and accompanying text.
117. Turner Interview I, supra note 93.
118. Immediately preceeding and during the state of emergency, prison counsellors
were forced to write many more evaluations than normal. Turner Interview I, supra note
93. The Parole Board heard twice the number of cases as normal during that period. Id.
119. Turner Interview I, supra note 93. See supra note 115.
Parole Board Chairman Turner said the Board was not influenced by the state of
emergency either to release more prisoners than required under the applicable legal standards or to inhibit releases due to a public concern about safety. Turner Interview I,
supra note 93.
120. Turner Interview I, supra note 93. If parole is denied for failure to provide an
adequate hearing, it is unlikely that the prisoner can advance a legal claim. Few legal
guidelines have been established for the conduct of release hearings. See MICH. CoMP.
LAws §§ 791.234-.235 (1979); MlcH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.7701-.7710 (1979). See also
MlcH. ADMIN. CODER. 791.7715 (1979) (the prisoner is entitled to notice of criteria and
standards employed by the Board in making its decision). H parole is granted improperly, the parole board retains authority to suspend and rescind the parole of a prisoner
who has been given a parole date, but who has not been released. MlcH. CoMP. LAws §
791.236 (1979); MICH. ADMIN. CoDE R. 791.7720(1). Department of Corrections Rules
provide that the prisoner be brought before the parole board and given a rescission hearing. MICH. ADMIN. CODER. 791.7720(1). Furthermore, the parole order may be suspended
and annulled where adverse information is received after release regarding behavior that
occurred prior to release. MICH. ADMIN. CODER. 791.7720(2).
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2. Problems with the Act's Language- The wording of the
statute poses three major difficulties in interpretation and implementation.
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Action- The Act states that
exhaustion of administrative action is a prerequisite to implementation, yet it does not define "exhaustion."121 By declaring
that all administrative actions "consistent with applicable state
laws and the rules promulgated under those laws" must be exhausted, 122 the statute establishes a condition, not a .limitation
upon the number or type of administrative measures mandated.
The Corrections Commission has interpreted exhaustion of administrative actions to mean that before seeking a declaration of
a state of emergency from the governor it must: (1) request the
parole board to exercise discretion in favor of granting parole;
(2) request the parole board, when considering the disposition of
a parole violation, to exercise its discretion by imposing sanctions less severe than revocation whenever possible; (3) order
expansion of community corrections programs; and (4) enter
into agreements whenever possible to permit housing of state
prisoners in county jails. 123 Nevertheless, even with these informal guidelines, the lack of a minimum standard has left the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative action on the Commission. Thus, contrary to the drafters' intent, 1 , . the statutory
language permits a governor to obstruct enforcement by challenging the Commission's findings and demanding proof of
exhaustion. 1211
The parole board can use the doctrine of governmental immunity to shelter itself from
tort liability for a decision to parole a prisoner who subsequently commits a felony while
on parole. See Seiss v. Bureau of Pardons and Paroles, 74 Mich. App. 613, 255 N.W.2d 2
(1977); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). But see Note, Holding Governments
Strictly Liable for the Release of Dangerous Parolees, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 (1980)
(arguing that parole institutions should be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from
decisions to release).
121. See supra note 69.
122. M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.73 (Supp. 1981).
123. Crane Letter, supra note 67.
124. Boyd Interview II, supra note 63. Representative Padden contended that requiring the governor to declare a state of emergency - provided he found the Corrections
Commission had not acted in error - would permit the governor to challenge the Commission's findings and yet still facilitate a simple mandamus proceeding should the governor refuse to act. Minutes of the Joint Legislative/Executive Task Force on Prison
Overcrowding (June 4, 1980) at 4-5, in REPORT ON PRISON OVERCROWDING, supra note 59.
125. M1cH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4411 (1979) provides grounds for mandamus actions
against public officials. However, Michigan courts have consistently held that the governor is not subject to mandamus, regardless of whether the act in question is ministerial
or discretionary in nature. See Born v. Dillman, 264 Mich. 440, 446, 250 N.W. 282, 284
(1933); Germaine v. Governor, 176 Mich. 585, 588, 142 N.W. 738, 739 (1913); Sutherland
v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320; 18 Am. Rep. 89 (1874).
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The reason for this unintended shift in the burden of proof
stems from the legislature's desire to ensure that the Act be utilized only as a last resort. 128 As long as the definition of administrative action remains open-ended, the Act requires the implementation of all means of prison population control - both
traditional and non-traditional - prior to the declaration of a
state of emergency. Moreover, inclusion of a specific definition
would require frequent amendment to cover developments in
non-traditional methods of prison population control. Although
these legislative concerns are valid, formulation of a nonexclusive definition, which includes the administrative actions that
should be exhausted, is more consistent with legislative intent; it
reduces the governor's ability to obstruct the Act while assuring
the public that the statute is essentially a last resort measure. 117
In any event, this is not a serious problem because a dispute
between the governor and the· Corrections Commission, an executive agency, is unlikely to· arise. 1118
b. Limitation on Sentence Reduction- The Act does not provide for a third sentence reduction stage in the event that the
first two stages fail to reduce prison population to ninety-five
percent capacity. 129 Furthermore, the statute does not specify
grounds for rescinding the state of emergency after the second
stage has expired. 180 Thus, if the second stage reduction fails to
achieve its goal, the state of emergency will technically remain in
effect despite the Act's inability to relieve the continuing cri126. Boyd Interview II, supra note 63. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
127. Boyd Interview II, supra note 63. Drafters of the Act intended exhaustion of
administrative remedies to include parole, community corrections placement, and extended furloughs. They chose not to incorporate this or any other definition because: (1)
it might require frequent amendment to keep pace with developments in population control techniques; (2) a dispute between the governor and the Corrections Commission, an
administrative agency, was regarded as unlikely; and (3) even if a disagreement arose the
issue could be litigated. Id.
128. See supra note 127. The governor appoints the members of the Corrections
Commission for six year terms. The term of some members, however, may extend beyond
the duration of an administration. Boyd Interview II, supra note 63.
129. If the first stage of sentence reductions does not reduce state prison population
to 95% of rated design capacity within 90 days of the declaration of the state of emergency, the Act clearly provides that prisoners' sentences. will be reduced by 90 days.
M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.75 (Supp. 1981); see supra note 75 and accompanying
text. The Act provides neither explicitly nor implicitly that additional sentence reductions will follow without the declaration of another state of emergency. Drafters of the
Act admit they failed to anticipate the need for more than two sentence reduction stages.
Boyd Interview II, supra note 63. See supra note 95.
130. The Act stipulates that the Corrections Commission can request the governor to
rescind the state of emergency only if prison population is reduced to 95% rated design
capacity during the state of emergency. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 800.76 (Supp. 1981);
see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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sis. 131 Overpopulation in Michigan prisons may never become so
acute as to require three consecutive sentence reduction
stages, 132 yet several factors suggest that prison population will
increase dramatically in the near future. First, after January 1,
1984, rated design capacity will no longer include temporary
housing. 133 Second, prison facilities presently under construction
are not scheduled to be completed until 1984-85. 134
The absence of statutory language providing for a third stage
need not prove fatal. Under Michigan law, the governor holds
broad executive authority to declare and rescind states of emergency.13& Should prison population exceed ninety-five percent
capacity at the end of two reduction stages, the governor may
rescind the emergency and proclaim a new one. 138
c. Limited Eligibility for Second Reduction Stage- The language of the Act providing for a second reduction stage limits
parole eligibility to "prisoners incarcerated in state prisons on
that date who have established minimum prison terms."137 The
date limitation refers apparently to the date the secondary stage
of sentence reduction begins. This language is clearly the result
131. An exception exists where prison population declines without the aid of the Act
after completion of the two sentence reduction stages. Because the state of emergency
continues in theory ad infinitum until population is reduced to 95% rated design capacity, a drop in population to 95% of capacity anytime after the emergency is declared
meets the condition for rescission.
132. According to Parole Board Chairman Turner, it is impossible to· determine
whether more than two sentence reduction stages will ever be required to attain 95%
capacity. Turner Interview II, supra note 98.
133. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.78(2); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
An estimated 813 prisoners are presently being held in temporary housing. Frye Interview II, supra note 108.
134. A prison facility in Lansing with a capacity of 240 prisoners is expected to be
completed in 1984-85. The Detroit House of Corrections Men's Regional Facility is also
scheduled to be completed in 1984-85 and will hold 550 prisoners.
In addition, the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia, presently containing 1,217 prisoners,
will be demolished before 1990. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.220d (Supp. 1981).
135. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.31-.33 (1979).
136. Strictly construed, the governor's broad emergency powers do not extend to rescission of states of emergency which have been ordered by the Corrections Committee
at the legislature's direction. See id. However, the statutory grant of emergency powers
to the governor is intended by the legislature to be construed broadly. MICH. CoMP. LAws
§ 10.32 (1979). Moreover, even if rescission of a Commission-ordered emergency is held
to be outside the governor's authority, he may assert that the declaration was made upon
his own volition - as permitted by the authorizing provision - and accordingly rescind
it. The governor can also disregard the pending state of emergency and declare a new
state of emergency in reliance upon his broad statutory authority.
These suggested remedies, however, grant far greater discretion to the governor than
intended by the statute's drafters. See supra note 124. The legislature can reduce the
governor's discretion by amending the statute to provide limitless reduction stages during a state of emergency.
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.75 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
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of drafting errors. The drafters of the Act intended eligibility
under the second stage to parallel that of the first stage. 188 As
written, however, the provision excludes from eligibility incarcerated prisoners who hold minimum sentences during the second ninety day period but are not in prison on the date the second stage begins. 1811 While this flaw does not undermine the
effectiveness of the critical first sentence reduction stage, its
consequences are serious. In community corrections programs,
for example, sentence reductions are denied to the group of prisoners who are closest to their parole date and best suited to reenter society. uo This section, therefore, should be amended to
parallel the first stage of sentence reduction.
CONCLUSION

The Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act does not
eradicate the sources of prison overcrowding. Yet, unlike past
informal and discretionary uses of accelerated parole, the Act
138. Telephone Interview with James Boyd, Aide to the House Corrections Committee and Member of the Task Force on Prison Overcrowding (Mar. 22, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Boyd Telephone Interview]. The drafters intended the second stage to function
in a manner similar to the first stage of sentence reductions and the limiting language
was thought only to apply to prisoners outside the state prison system, i.e., prisoners in
county jails, federal prisons, and escapees. Id.; see Light Letter, supra note 93.
This section of the Act was the product of a House Corrections Committee amendment designed to replace a more controversial draft of the second stage. 117 House J.
3008-09 (1980). Difficulties arising with the second stage of sentence reductions may have
resulted from hurried redrafting. Boyd Telephone Interview, supra.
139. The Department of Corrections intends to construe this limitation strictly, reducing only the sentences of state prisoners who are listed as held in Bureau of Correctional Facilities on that date. Johnson Interview, supra note 63.
140. Of the groups of prisoners that will be excluded from eligibility for second stage
sentence reductions, the most important will be prisoners in community corrections programs. Approximately 12% of the state corrections population, over 2,000 individuals,
reside in community residential programs, and they represent the segment of the population closest to release. Light Letter, supra note 93. If there are no openings in community corrections, the Act will have little remedial effect on state prisons. Boyd Interview
II, supra note 63.
Furthermore, Department of Corrections studies indicate that prisoners placed in
community residential programs prior to release on parole commit four times fewer
crimes than those paroled directly from prison, Department of Corrections, Press Release (Sept. 24, 1980) (variation attributed to the Department's successful classification
and screening of community program residents) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform), and that they are significantly better risks on parole, Department of Corrections,
Press Release (Sept. 21, 1981) (variation attributed to the Department's effective risk
prediction techniques) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). See generally Department of Corrections, Policy Directive - DWA - 30.02 (Dec. 1, 1978); Department of Corrections, Policy Directive - DWA - 43.01 (Aug. 1, 1978) (guidelines for residential security classification and community residential program placement).
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balances effectively the needs of prisoners and prison officials
against public safety during periods of prison overcrowding. The
Act provides immediate relief for prisons which violate constitutional standards, facilitates efficient and cost-effective correctional management, and forestalls court intervention to allow
the legislature time to develop long-term reforms that will eliminate overcrowding. As an intermediate step toward systemic reform, the Michigan Act offers new hope to states confronting
acute prison overcrowding.

-Frank T. Judge III

